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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the macroeconomic effects of increased spending on defense and 
internal security necessitated by the decade-long Maoist insurgency in Nepal.  An 
investment equation is specified to examine the relationship between defense 
spending and investment.  The estimation results indicate that there is a significant 
negative effect of defense spending on investment.  A simple Harrod-Domar growth 
relationship is used to estimate the effect of the increase in defense spending on 
economic growth.  This analysis suggests that between 1996 and 2006, the 
opportunity cost of the conflict in terms of lost output has been about 3 percent of 
Nepal’s current GDP. Journal of International and Global Studies 
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Introduction 
This paper examines some macroeconomic effects and opportunity costs of 
increases in security spending by the Nepalese government to finance its war against the 
Maoist rebellion that began in 1996.  Since that time, sharp increases in security spending 
by the government have resulted in a decline in real investment which, in turn, has 
reduced economic growth.  In addition to these direct costs, the conflict has also resulted 
in significant indirect costs, such as disruptions in trade and commerce, loss in tourism 
revenue, a toll on children, loss of infrastructure, and reduction in foreign investment.  
Although important, these indirect costs are not the main focus of this paper, so they are 
examined only briefly. 
Economic theory suggests that an increase in government or military spending 
can crowd out private investment and may lead to lower rates of economic growth and 
lost output.  Alternatively, military spending can also lead to some positive effects on 
economic growth through a Keynesian-type expansion whereby an increase in aggregate 
demand results in increased output and employment.  A number of studies have examined 
the effect of higher defense spending on economic growth in developing countries.  Some 
analysts argue that military spending may have a favorable effect on economic growth. 
For instance, Benoit (1973, 1978) shows that military spending positively affected 
economic growth for a sample of 44 developing countries from 1950 to 1965.  He argues 
that military spending increases economic growth, as it improves human capital through 
education and vocational and technical training.  In addition, research and development 
as well as production activities by the military may provide positive externalities to the 
civilian sector.  He also contends that reducing military spending in developing countries 
will not necessarily raise economic growth because only a small fraction of the decrease 
in military spending results in productive investment.  However, most studies on the 
subject find that defense spending tends to have an adverse impact on economic growth, 
either directly or indirectly.  Examples include studies by Lim (1983), Deger and Sen 
(1983), Faini, Annez, and Taylor (1984), Maizels and Nissanke (1985), Deger (1986), 
Chan (1986), Grobas and Gnanaselvam (1993), Roux (1996), Pradhan (2001), 
Arunatilake et al. (2001), and Ra and Singh (2005).  
Still other studies suggest that there is no causal relationship between military 
expenditures and economic growth in either direction.  For instance, studies by Biswas 
and Ram (1986), Payne and Ross (1992), and Kim (1996) found no consistent 
relationship between military spending and economic growth.  Similarly, Dakurah et al. 
(2001) found no causal relationship between military spending and economic growth 
based on their study of 62 countries.  The empirical literature thus suggests that the 
relationship cannot be generalized across countries and may depend on an array of factors 
including the period of study, the level of socio-economic development of the country, 
and how the military expenditures are financed. 
The majority of the studies cited above have used a multicountry approach to 
examine the relationship between military spending and economic growth in developing Nepal’s Civil War and Its Economic Costs 
116 
 
 
countries.  While multicountry approaches are useful, a case study approach may be more 
illustrative.  After all, circumstances and policy responses are likely to vary across 
countries and the nature of the policies pursued is likely to affect the relationship between 
military spending and economic growth.  This paper therefore adopts a case study 
approach in an attempt to analyze the economic costs of Nepal’s decade long civil war. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  The next two sections provide overviews of 
the Nepalese economy and the Maoist insurgency.  The civil war’s macroeconomic 
effects in terms of lower investment and reduced nonmilitary expenditures are then 
discussed.  This discussion is followed by some quantitative estimates of the opportunity 
costs in terms of the economic growth sacrificed and lost output.  Some indirect costs 
discussed in the subsequent section.  The final section summarizes the main findings and 
concludes the paper. 
 
Brief Background of Nepal’s Economy
1
Between 1990 and 2001, Nepal’s aggregate GDP increased by 5.3 percent per 
year and per capita income increased by more than 2.5 percent as the economy responded 
to macroeconomic stability and liberalization, and declining population growth rates.  
There was also a rapid growth in trade.  However, by the turn of the 21
st century, 
intensification of the Maoist conflict and political instability, together with the effects of 
the global recession, led to a sharp reduction in exports, manufacturing, and tourism 
services.  For the first time in 19 years, negative growth was recorded in 2002.  A 
slowdown in revenue growth and a sharp increase in security expenditures created an 
unprecedented budget crisis.  The shortfall in revenue and difficulties in implementing 
development programs in conflict areas reduced development spending by about 20 
percent.  As the budget crisis deepened in 2003, development spending, in real terms, fell 
to a ten-year low. GDP growth did recover in 2003 and 2004, registering a 3.4 and 3.7 
percent growth rate.  The corresponding growth rates for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 
 
 
Nepal has made some encouraging progress in development since it emerged 
from self-imposed isolation in the 1950s, at which time it had virtually no infrastructure.  
Access to basic public services such as primary education, health care, electricity, and 
sanitation has increased significantly since that time.  Almost 90 percent of Nepal’s 
primary-aged school children are now enrolled in school.  The infant mortality rate has 
dropped from 165 (per 1,000 live births) in 1970 to 48 in 2006.  Although still among the 
lowest in South Asia, life expectancy at birth has increased to 63 years. 
Nepal made the transition from absolute monarchy to multiparty democracy in 
1990.  Unfortunately, democracy also ushered in political instability; there have been 18 
governments since 1990.  As might be expected, there has been no coherent drive to 
promote economic development or to mobilize and utilize domestic revenues efficiently.  
The country is faced with low returns on public investments and inadequate government 
services.  The decade-long civil war, which began in 1996, has claimed more than 13,000 
lives. Journal of International and Global Studies 
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were 2.4, 2.9, 2.7 and 5.3 percent. 
During the past ten years or so, the headcount poverty rate has dropped sharply to 
about 30 percent, although there are wide disparities based on geography, caste, ethnicity 
and gender, and inequality in Nepal is the highest in South Asia.  With an annual per 
capita income of about $470, Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in the world.  
Only 35 percent of the women are literate, compared to 63 percent of men. Nepal’s 
population of 28 million is still growing at about 2 percent a year, and the ratio of 
population to arable land is one of the highest in the world. 
 
The Maoist Insurgency
2 
In February 1996, after winning only nine out of 205 seats in parliament in earlier 
elections, Maoist rebels launched an armed struggle to replace Nepal’s constitutional 
monarchy with a communist republic.  Given Nepal’s deep rural poverty, caste and ethnic 
discrimination, endemic corruption, and a concentration of wealth and power, it is not 
surprising that the Maoist message resonated with the Nepali population.  Within months, 
Maoist leaders created a highly organized insurgency.  In August 2001, attempts at peace 
talks stalled after three rounds of negotiations over the question of Nepal’s constitutional 
monarchy.  In November 2001, the Maoists walked out of the negotiations, broke the 
ceasefire and resumed attacks on government troops.  A state of emergency that lasted for 
10 months was imposed, and the army was ordered to fight the rebels for the first time. 
Over half of the more than 13,000 deaths occurred since the army joined the fight in 
2001. 
The government and rebels declared another ceasefire in January 2003.  However, 
despite several rounds of talks, the two sides could not agree on the role of the monarchy. 
The Maoists demanded an election to form a constituent assembly.  This assembly would 
draft a new constitution that would offer the option of abolishing the monarchy.  The 
government refused the Maoists’ ultimatum and insisted that the Maoists either surrender 
their weapons or tone down their demands to fit existing laws.  Some analysts suggest 
that the Maoist leadership was also under pressure from within its own ranks, with inured 
fighters eager to launch fresh assaults against government forces.  The Maoists withdrew 
officially from the ceasefire on August 27, 2003 as peace talks between the government 
and Maoist insurgents collapsed.  The country promptly plunged into more violence. 
Even during the so-called ceasefires, both government and Maoist forces 
regularly breached the code of conduct that was supposed to govern their activities during 
the stops in fighting.  Both sides believed that the other was planning an impending 
attack.  The Maoists continued to recruit heavily and succeeded in penetrating urban 
areas.  They continued to practice widespread extortion from businessmen, aid groups, 
and villagers to fill their coffers. They even fired on a motorcade of a former prime 
minister.  For their part, the government forces continued to make their presence felt 
throughout the countryside and summarily executed people they suspected of being 
Maoists in a remote village in eastern Nepal. Nepal’s Civil War and Its Economic Costs 
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The Maoists had an estimated 4,000 hard-core fighters and a militia of about 
15,000.  They roamed freely in the countryside and claimed to control 80 percent of the 
country.  This claim may have been an exaggeration, but it was true that the government 
did not exist in most rural areas, which were frequented by roaming Maoist extortionists. 
The number of soldiers in the Royal Nepalese Army grew to about 90,0000 by 2005, up 
from  45,000 in November 2001 when the army was mobilized to combat the Maoist 
rebels.  The army headed the unified command, which included its own soldiers, 18,000 
armed police and 10,000 policemen deputed from the Nepal Police.  The army was 
heavily armed with the help of India and the United States, which provided $17 million in 
military equipment and training.  The army’s outdated weapons were replaced with 
mortars, machine guns and M-16 rifles provided by the American, Indian and Belgian 
governments, as well as with British and Indian helicopters.  Counterinsurgency training 
was provided to the government forces by expert teams from India and the United States. 
In October 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed the political parties from power and 
was unwilling or unable to restore the democratic process.  Instead, he took over state 
power on February 1, 2005,declared a state of emergency, and severely curtailed 
fundamental rights.  Subsequently, India, the United States, and the United Kingdom 
froze all military aid to Nepal.  Three months later, the state of emergency was removed, 
primarily to appease the international community, although fundamental rights were not 
restored.  The king continued to strengthen his absolute powers and targeted leaders of 
the political parties.  This move by the king pushed the seven parliamentary parties to 
form an alliance (SPA) with the Maoists.  This alliance organized a mass uprising against 
the king, which left more than 20 dead and many more wounded.  On April 21, 2006, the 
king was forced to relinquish authority and indicated that “power was being returned to 
the people.”  The Maoists agreed to a cease fire and an “armed management” process.  
Under this deal, both Maoist and government armies and arms were to be kept in a secure 
place under the supervision of the United Nations.  As the country edged toward a 
solution to 10 years of civil war, rivalries between caste and ethnic groups threatened the 
peace process.  A new crop of ethnically-based groups such as the Madhesis (Nepalis 
from the southern plains) began making separatist demands regarding an end to 
domination by the Brahmins and Chhetris, the two highest Hindu castes.  Fourteen 
months of protests reaped havoc in the southern Terai region, and scores died in ethnic 
and caste-based violence.  On December 28, 2007, in an almost unanimous vote, the 
interim parliament declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, relegating Nepal’s 240-
year-old monarchy to oblivion.  This historic verdict was conditional on approval by the 
first meeting of the constituent assembly. 
The elections for the constituent assembly, which is responsible for drafting a new 
constitution and which also serves as the parliament, were held on April 10, 2008.  The 
Maoists won the most seats (220 of 601) but could not form a government because a 
president needed to be elected first.  In the indirect presidential election, Mr. Ram Baran 
Yadav of the mainstream Nepali Congress party won with 308 out of the 590 votes in the 
assembly, offering a setback to the Maoists’ hopes of dictating the direction of Journal of International and Global Studies 
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constitutional reforms. 
On August 15
th, 2008, after months of bickering, Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal was elected prime minister, with the support of a large majority of the constituent 
assembly, and a Maoist-led coalition government was formed.  Trouble, however, began 
to brew regarding the intractable issue of the future of the armed forces.  Under the peace 
agreement, some 23,000 Maoists guerillas were supposed to be integrated into the Nepali 
army, which refused to follow the injunction of the Moist-led government.  Mr. Dahal 
sacked the army chief, but the president, who had the support of almost every other 
political party, reinstated him, which led to the resignation of Mr. Dahal on May 4
th, 
2009. On May 23
rd, Madhav Kumar Nepal, the leader of the moderate Unified Marxist-
Leninist (UML) party became the new prime minister.  Although Mr. Nepal has the 
support of 21 of the 24 political parties in the assembly, the Maoists, who won 38 percent 
of the seats in the assembly, do not support him and have refused to join the new 
government. 
After another round of bickering, the main coalition partners in the new 
government have formed a new cabinet.  It is uncertain how long this government will 
last or if the Maoists can be coaxed back to the table.  A return to civil war still seems 
possible.  In any event, lasting peace will not obtain unless the dispute regarding the 
future of the two armies is resolved.  Unfortunately, and as has become common in 
Nepali politics, uncertainty looms yet again. 
 
Macroeconomic Effects
3 
 
In 1996, when the insurgency began, security spending was about 0.9 percent of 
GDP.  In 2006, it was 2.5 percent.  By some estimates, security expenses grew by over 
300 percent between 2000 and 2006, mostly due to the purchase of arms and ammunition.  
During 2002, spending on security increased 32 percent to $170 million in a $788 million 
budget to purchase advanced weapons and logistics for the police and the army to fight 
the insurgency.  In 2006, security spending increased by 10 percent to about $280 
million. As more money was pumped into the war effort, fewer funds were available for 
development.  For an extremely poor country whose budget depends on foreign aid for a 
third of its total outlay, such disproportionate increases in security spending can be 
expected to have lingering and considerable effects. 
The effects of the conflict on economic growth and welfare depend in part on how 
the government chooses to finance its war.  One way the government can finance an 
increase in defense spending is to obtain the extra funds by curtailing spending in others 
areas such as health, education, and public investment.  Another alternative is to borrow 
from domestic sources, from the central bank, or from abroad.  Following Grobar and 
Gnanaselvam (1993), the macroeconomic effects of Nepal’s Maoist insurgency are 
examined by first looking at the basic open-economy saving-investment relationship: 
 
I + (G - T) = S + (M - X)              (1) Nepal’s Civil War and Its Economic Costs 
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where I is investment, G is government consumption, T is tax revenues, S is private 
saving, M is imports and X is exports.  Dividing government spending into defense 
spending (GD), which includes spending on internal security, and nonsecurity spending 
(GN), and rearranging, the above identity can be rewritten as: 
 
GD = S - I + (M - X) + (T - GN).            (2) 
 
Equation (2) states that higher defense spending will have to be offset by adjustments in 
private saving, investment, the balance of payments, taxes, or nonsecurity spending.  
From 1990 to 96, defense spending increased by about 67 percent, and from 1996 to 2006 
it increased by 215 percent.  While investment increased about 50 percent from 1990 to 
1996, it declined by more than 8 percent between 1996 and 1999 and increased about 7 
percent from 1996 to 2006.  Similarly, while national saving increased by more than 75 
percent from 1990 to 1996, it fell by 26 percent from 1996 to 2006.  Finally, trade 
volume increased 84 percent from 1990 to 1996 but fell by 16 percent from 1996 to 2006.  
We see from the data that there has been a significant increase in defense spending and a 
decline in real investment. 
Nepal continues to rely heavily on foreign savings as a source of investment 
finance.  There has been a continued inflow of capital as the trade balance has remained 
negative.  The trade deficit did narrow in the late 1990s, but the gap started to widen in 
2003.  External debt at about 50 percent of GDP in 1990 continued to increase in 
subsequent years, while registering a gradual decline in recent years.  Total debt service 
as a ratio of GDP was 1.9 percent in 1990 and 1.6 percent in 2003.  Total debt service as 
a percentage of exports was 15.7 percent in 1990, 6.2 percent in 2002, and about 5 
percent in 2006. 
It is apparent that the government has had to make some choices to finance its 
spending to fight the Maoist insurgency.  The data suggests that increased spending on 
defense and internal security has been associated with lower investment and reduced 
nonmilitary government expenditure, especially in economic services.  These trends are 
inauspicious; lower investment results on slower growth rates and lower living standards 
in the future.  In other words, the opportunity costs of increases in defense spending are 
likely to be high.  These costs are discussed next. 
 
Opportunity Costs 
This section provides some quantitative estimates of the opportunity costs of the 
civil war in Nepal.  An attempt is made to estimate the economic growth sacrificed as a 
result of higher spending on defense and internal security.  To this end, it is necessary to 
estimate the effect of the increased defense spending on investment behavior. Following 
Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993), a model of investment is specified in which the level of 
investment depends on the supply of financial resources. Journal of International and Global Studies 
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Resources available to finance investment come from three sources.  The first is 
private domestic saving, which is a direct function of real per capita income: 
 
SP = S(YP).                (3) 
 
The second source is public or government saving.  The ability of the government to 
finance investment depends on its ability to raise revenue and its other expenditure 
commitments.  Spending on defense and internal security reduces the government’s 
ability to finance investment.  In addition, higher spending on social programs will 
reduce funds available for investment.  Spending by the government on social programs 
has been somewhat lower since 1990, when multiparty democracy was restored.  This 
reduced spending reflects the increased emphasis placed on market-oriented policies and 
lower emphasis on social spending.  Thus, public saving available to finance investment 
is modeled as: 
 
SG = SG(YP, GD, D)              (4) 
 
where D is a dummy variable reflecting the post-1990 period.  Since several years may 
elapse before investment behavior is affected by government policy, the dummy variable 
is lagged. 
The third source of investment finance is foreign saving.  Capital flows (K) are 
treated as exogenous.  We thus have an investment equation of the following form where 
investment, defense spending, and capital inflows are measured as ratios of GDP: 
 
I = I(YP, GD, K, D).              (5) 
 
This study is based on annual time series data from 1980 to 2006.  Data have been 
obtained from several sources--several issues of the Quarterly Economic Bulletin, 
published by Nepal Rastra Bank (the central bank), various issues of Economic Survey, 
published by Nepal’s Ministry of Finance, the Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific, 
available on the Asian Development Bank web site, the International Financial Statistics, 
published by the IMF, and World Development Indicators CD-ROM 200.  As the 
necessary data were not readily available from any single source, it was necessary to rely 
on several sources.  As might be expected, data from different sources were usually not 
compatible. 
 
Estimation and Results
4 
 
The results of the estimation (see Table 3) indicate that there is a significant 
negative effect of defense spending on investment, even when accounting for other 
variables that affect investment behavior.  Per capita GDP and capital inflows have a 
positive and significant effect on investment behavior.  The coefficient on the Nepal’s Civil War and Its Economic Costs 
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government dummy variable carries the expected positive sign since government policy 
after 1990 has been more market and growth-oriented. 
The coefficient on defense spending indicates that an increase in the ratio of 
defense spending to GDP of 1 percentage point will reduce the ratio of investment to 
GDP by about 1.3 percentage points.  Following Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993), a 
simple Harrod-Domar growth model is used to estimate the effect of the recent increase 
in defense spending on economic growth.  Given a fixed incremental capital-output ratio 
(ICOR), the basic Harrod-Domar relationship for the economy is: 
 
g = (s/ICOR) - d 
where g is the growth rate of output, s is the saving (or investment) rate, and d is the 
depreciation rate. 
Nepal’s ICOR has varied over time.  Calculated from data during the 1990-2006 
period, the ICOR ranged from 2 to 2.4.  Since the Maoist insurgency began in 1996, the 
ratio of defense spending to GDP has increased by 1.1 percentage points.  Table 4 
indicates that a 1.1 percentage point increase in defense spending, all else constant, will 
be associated with a 1.44 percentage drop in the ratio of investment to GDP.  Table 4 
shows the corresponding change in the growth rate given different assumptions about the 
value of the ICOR.  The table also shows the estimates of the increased level of defense 
spending brought about by the insurgency in terms of reduced output as a result of lower 
levels of investment.  If we apply an ICOR of 2 for Nepal, the opportunity cost of the 
conflict in terms of lost output from 1996-2006 is about 22 billion rupees, or about $315 
million, which is about 3 percent of Nepal’s 2007 GDP, not a trivial amount.  In addition, 
the conflict has a number of other costs such as loss in agricultural production, cost of 
personal property, buildings and infrastructure damaged by the conflict, loss of tourism 
revenue, and disruptions in trade and commerce.  Some of these additional costs are 
discussed in the next section. 
A note of caution is in order. The Harrod-Domar framework used in this study is 
subject to uncertainty over the value of the ICOR and the appropriate depreciation rate. 
Calculated ICORs tend to vary considerably due to cyclical effects. As such, the 
estimation of the economic growth forgone due to the lower private investment crowded 
out by defense spending should be viewed only as a rough approximation. 
 
Indirect Costs 
 
The Maoist conflict in Nepal has resulted in other costs. The conflict has led to a 
slowdown in development activities, particularly in rural areas.  The Asian Development 
Bank estimates that only 88 percent of the targeted government spending was realized, 
which has had adverse impacts on health, drinking water, roads, and agriculture. 
The tourism industry has been particularly hard hit.  Tourism has been Nepal’s 
main foreign currency earner, bringing in about 400,000 thousand visitors and more than Journal of International and Global Studies 
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$650 million in revenue every year.  An estimated 1.5 million people depend on the 
tourism industry, which contributes over 18 percent to the Nepal’s gross domestic 
product. If properly managed, it is estimated that the tourism industry could generate 
employment for more than 6 million people.  The escalation of the conflict with the 
Maoists resulted in a sharp drop in the number of tourists.  Specifically, tourist arrivals 
fell by about 6 percent in 2000, 23 percent in 2001, 24 percent in 2002, and 3 percent in 
2005.  As a percentage of total exports, tourism revenue declined 24 percent in 1997, 15 
percent in 2002, and 40 percent in 2005.  Moreover, because tourism has a strong link 
with other industries, the downturn in the tourism sector had a significant negative impact 
on up to 80 percent of other industries in the country. 
The conflict has also had an adverse impact on trade and commerce.   Following 
trade liberalization policy, exports and imports grew rapidly for much of the 1990s.  For 
instance, exports increased 36 percent in 1992 and 33 percent in 1994.  However, exports 
fell by 8 percent in 1996, 14 percent in 1998, 19 percent in 2002, and 13 percent in 2003.  
While weak external demand and intensified competition were responsible, production 
disruptions emanating from the conflict played an important role.  Regular strikes 
affected businesses and had adverse effects on foreign investments. 
Some analysts have argued that children, particularly those from poor families in 
the remote hills, have been among the most severely affected by the conflict.  According 
to The New York Times (December 9, 2004), human rights groups estimate that tens of 
thousands of children were abducted by Maoists and forced to attend indoctrination 
camps or have been sent into exile by frightened parents.  The Nepalese army is also 
alleged to have used children as spies and messengers.  Concern Center for Child 
Workers in Nepal, a leading child rights organization, has said that hundreds of children 
were killed in the violence.  An estimated 5,000 children have been displaced as a result 
of their parents fleeing to safer towns, 2,000 children have been orphaned, and 10,000 
have been denied access to education.  Children have died at the hands of both the rebels 
and security forces, while some have simply been caught in the crossfire.  Thousands of 
children face an uncertain future due to the psychological trauma caused by the cycle of 
violence.  Maoist rebels in particular were blamed for using children on the battlefront.  
An international child rights group, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, says 
that children normally began working as porters and messengers and then often ended up 
on the frontline.  Security forces were also accused of victimizing innocent children on 
suspicion of collaborating with the rebels.  According to a recent survey, less than 37 
percent of children were vaccinated in two districts affected by the rebellion, compared 
with a national average of 75 percent.  Attacks on teachers forced many teachers to leave, 
affecting the education of children. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has estimated some effects of increased military spending associated 
with Nepal’s decade-long civil war that began in 1996.  Clearly, the most serious cost of 
the conflict has been the loss of over 13,000 lives, but there are clear economic costs of Nepal’s Civil War and Its Economic Costs 
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the conflict as well.  This paper has focused on the macroeconomic effects of increased 
security spending as a result of the conflict.  Nepal has made some encouraging progress 
in development since it emerged from self-imposed isolation in the 1950s.  After the 
transition from absolute monarchy to multiparty democracy in 1990, economic 
performance was encouraging.  However, weak political leadership, continued political 
instability and, more recently, the Maoist insurgency, have all exacted a severe toll on the 
economy. 
After brief overviews of the Nepalese economy and the Maoist insurgency, the 
macroeconomic effects of increased government spending on defense and internal 
security were discussed.  Increased defense spending resulted in a decline in real 
investment as well as a reduction in spending on economic services.  An investment 
equation was specified to examine the relationship between defense spending and 
investment.  After a battery of tests, an error correction model was developed and 
estimated.  The estimated results indicate that there is a significant negative effect of 
defense spending on investment, even when accounting for other variables that affect 
investment behavior.  Next, a simple Harrod-Domar growth relationship was used to 
estimate the effect of the increase in defense spending on economic growth.  This 
analysis indicates that from 1996 to 2006, the opportunity cost of the conflict in terms of 
lost output has been about 3 percent of Nepal’s current GDP.  In addition to these direct 
costs, the paper has argued that lost tourism revenue, disruptions in trade and commerce, 
and a significant toll on children represent some significant indirect costs of the conflict. 
Finally, as noted above, data challenges, particularly in obtaining values for the 
appropriate ICOR and depreciation rates, have been significant.  As such, the results 
obtained above using the Harrod-Domar framework should be viewed only as broad 
orders of magnitude.  They are intended to be a rough approximation of the economic 
growth forgone due to the private investment crowded out by increased spending on 
defense. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Unit Root Test (variables in first difference) 
   
Variable 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
 
Phillips-Perron Test 
 
I 
 
-5.83*** 
 
-5.96*** 
 
YP 
 
-4.72*** 
 
-4.93*** 
 
GD 
 
-5.23** 
 
-5.87*** 
 
K 
 
-6.16*** 
 
-7.62*** 
 
Note:  ***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level.  Journal of International and Global Studies 
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Table 2 
Johansen’s Cointegration Test 
     
Ho 
 
Likelihood Ratio 
 
5% Critical Value 
 
1% Critical Value 
 
r #0 
 
122.6** 
 
84.25 
 
93.28 
 
r #1 
 
96.4** 
 
58.41 
 
66.24 
 
r #2 
 
66.3** 
 
37.62 
 
44.57 
 
r #3 
 
32.8* 
 
19.53 
 
25.49 
 
Note: **rejection of hypothesis at 1% level; *rejection of hypothesis at 
5% level. 
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Table 3 
Estimation of Equation (6) 
   
Variable     
 
ΔI 
 
Constant 
 
0.231 
(1.187) 
 
ΔYP 
 
0.124 
(3.426)*** 
 
ΔGD 
 
-1.281 
(3.031)*** 
 
ΔK   
 
0.317 
(4.481)*** 
 
ΔI-1 
 
0.518 
(2.981)** 
 
Dummy 
 
1.978 
(1.594) 
 
EC 
 
-1.147 
(3.128)*** 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.721 
 
Durbin-Watson 
 
1.875 
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
 
0.782 
 
F 
 
3.729*** 
 
RESET F 
 
1.231 
 
Note: ***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level. 
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Table 4 
Estimated Economic Effects, 1996-2006 
   
ICOR 
 
Projected Percentage-Point Drop in  
Growth Rate by 2006 
 
Estimated Loss of Output, 1996-2006 
(Millions of 1994/95 Rupees) 
 
2.0 
 
1.17 
 
22,275 
 
2.5 
 
0.93 
 
17,706 
 
3.0 
 
0.78 
 
14,850 
 
4.0 
 
0.59 
 
11,233 
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1Data in this section have been obtained from the World Bank and Asian Development websites. 
2Some of this discussion is based on the International Crisis Group’s Asia Briefing Paper: “Nepal: Back to the 
Gun,” October 22, 2003. 
3Data in this section have been obtained from the Asian Development Bank, Nepal Rastra Bank, and World 
Bank websites. 
4 Before carrying out the estimation of equation (5), it is important to test for the stationarity of the data 
series in order to avoid spurious regression.  Following Nelson and Plosser (1982), an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test is conducted using the constant term and trend.  In addition to the Dickey-Fuller test, the 
Phillips-Perron test (Phillips, 1987; Phillips-Perron, 1988) is also conducted to ensure the stationarity of the 
data series.  The Phillips-Perron test uses a non-parametric correction to deal with any correlation in the 
error terms.  Both tests indicate that most of the data series are non-stationary at the level and they all are 
stationary at the first-difference level.  The test results are reported in Table 1. 
 
After establishing the stationarity of the data series, Johansen’s cointegration test (Johansen, 1988; 
Johansen and Juselius, 1990) is conducted to examine the long-run relationship among the variables.  This 
involves the test of cointegrating vectors.  The cointegration test results, reported in Table 2, suggest that 
the hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected.  The existence of at least one cointegrating vector indicates 
that a long-term relationship among the variables exists.  Following Engle and Granger (1987), an error 
correction model is developed, which involves estimating the model in first-difference form and adding an 
error correction term as another explanatory variable. The error correction term is the lag of the estimated 
error term, derived by regressing the dependent variable with the independent variables in the model.  The 
error correction model developed is as follows: 
 
  ΔI = b0 + b1ΔYP + b2ΔGD + b3ΔK + b4ΔI-1 + b5Dummy + b6EC + v  (6) 
 
where EC is the error correction term and v is the random error term.  To ensure the absence of 
specification error, a RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) was also conducted.  To ensure the absence of any serial 
correlation, in addition to the Durbin-Watson test, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test was also conducted.  
Statistics for both of these tests indicate that the estimated results do not suffer from any serial correlation.  
The estimation of the error correction model is reported in Table 3. 
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